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The operationalization of general hypotheses
versus the discovery of empirical laws in
Psychology ∗
Stéphane Vautier
OCTOGONE-CERPP, Université de Toulouse (France)
Résumé : L’enseignement de la méthodologie scientifique en Psychologie
confère un rôle paradigmatique à l’opérationnalisation des « hypothèses géné-
rales » : une idée sans rapport précis à l’observation concrète se traduit par la
tentative de rejeter une hypothèse statistique nulle au profit d’une hypothèse
alternative, dite de recherche, qui opérationnalise l’idée générale. Cette dé-
marche s’avère particulièrement inadaptée à la découverte de lois empiriques.
Une loi empirique est définie comme un trou nomothétique émergeant d’un
référentiel de la forme Ω×M(X)×M(Y), où Ω est un ensemble d’événements
ou d’objets datés dont certains états dans l’ensemble M(Y) sont par hypo-
thèse impossibles étant données certaines conditions initiales décrites dans
l’ensemble M(X). Cette approche permet de préciser le regard que l’historien
des connaissances peut porter sur les avancées descriptives et nomothétiques
de la Psychologie empirique contemporaine.
Abstract: Psychology students learn to operationalise ‘general hypotheses’ as
a paradigm of scientific Psychology: relatively vague ideas result in an attempt
to reject the null hypothesis in favour of an alternative hypothesis, a so-called
research hypothesis, which operationalises the general idea. Such a practice
turns out to be particularly at odds with the discovery of empirical laws. An
empirical law is defined as a nomothetic gap emerging from a reference system
of the form Ω×M(X)×M(Y), where Ω is a set of events or dated objects for
which some states in the set M(Y) are hypothetically impossible given some
initial conditions depicted in the set M(X). This approach allows the knowl-
edge historian to carefully scrutinise descriptive and nomothetic advances in
contemporary empirical Psychology.
∗. I wish to express my thanks to Nadine Matton and Éric Raufaste for their
helpful comments on a previous version of this article. This work was funded in part
by the ANR-07-JCJC-0065-01 programme.
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This article is the result of the author’s need to elaborate on the
persistent dissatisfaction he feels with the methodology of scientific re-
search in Psychology, and more precisely with his perception of the way
in which it is taught. It would indeed be presumptuous to present the
following criticism as being a criticism of the methodology of scientific
research in Psychology as a whole, since the latter is a notion which
is too all-encompassing in its scope to serve as a precise description of
the diversity of research practice in this vast field. The source of this
dissatisfaction is to be found in what [Reuchlin 1992, 32] calls the ‘dis-
tance’ between ‘general theory’ and a ‘specific, falsifiable hypothesis’.
A certain form of academism shapes the approach to scientific research
in Psychology according to a three-stage process for the formulation of
hypotheses e.g., [Charbonneau 1988]. When they write the report of
an empirical study, researchers in Psychology must supply the grounds
for their research by introducing a so-called general (or theoretical) hy-
pothesis, then show how they have tested this hypothesis by restating
it as a so-called operational (or research) hypothesis. In principle, this
restatement should involve data analysis, finalised by testing at least one
inferential statistical hypothesis, the so-called null hypothesis.
As a socially regulated procedure, the sequencing of theoretical, op-
erational and null hypotheses—which we refer to here as operationaliza-
tion—may not pose scientific problems to researchers who are mainly
concerned with adhering to a socio-technical norm. The sense of dissat-
isfaction arises when this desire for socio-technical compliance is consid-
ered in the light of the hope (albeit an admittedly pretentious or naïve
hope) of discovering one or more empirical laws, i.e. demonstrating at
least one, corroborated general empirical statement, [Vautier 2011].
With respect to the discovery of empirical laws, operationalization
may be characterised as a paradigm, based on a ‘sandwich’ system, whose
workings prove to be strikingly ineffective. The ‘general hypothesis’ (the
uppermost layer of the ‘sandwich’ system) is not the statement of an
empirical law, but a pre-referential statement, i.e. a statement whose
empirical significance has not (yet) been determined. The null hypothe-
sis test (the lower layer of the ‘sandwich’) binds the research procedure
to a narrow, pragmatic decision-making approach amid uncertainty—
rejection or acceptance of the null hypothesis—which is not germane
to the search for empirical laws if the null hypothesis is not a general
statement in the strict sense of the term, i.e. held to be true for all the
elements in a given set. Between the external layers of the ‘sandwich’ sys-
tem lies the psychotechnical and statistical core of the operationalization
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paradigm, i.e. the production of psychological measurements to which
the variables required for the formulation of the operational hypothesis
are linked. Again, the claim here is not that this characterization of
research procedure in Psychology applies absolutely universally; how-
ever, operationalization as outlined above does appear to be sufficiently
typical of a certain orthodoxy to warrant a thorough critical analysis.
This paradigm governs an approach which is destined to establish
a favourable view of ‘general hypotheses’ inasmuch as they have psy-
chotechnical and inferential support. However, the ideological interest
of these statements does not automatically confer them with nomothetic
import. Consequently, one cannot help wondering whether the rule of
operationalization does not in fact serve to prevent those who practise it
from ever discerning a possible historical failure of orthodox Psychology
to discover its own empirical laws, by training the honest researcher not
to hope for the impossible. After all, we are unlikely to worry about
failing to obtain something which we were not looking for in the first
place. We shall see that an empirical law consists precisely of stating
an empirical impossibility, i.e. a partially deterministic falsifiable state-
ment. As a result, we have inevitably come to question psychological
thought as regards the reasons and consequences of an apodictic ap-
proach to probabilistic treatment of the empirical phenomena which it
is investigating.
This article comprises four major parts. First of all, we shall il-
lustrate operationalization on the basis of an example put forward by
[Fernandez & Catteeuw 2001]. Next, we shall identify two logical and
empirical difficulties which arise from this paradigm and demonstrate
that they render it unsuitable for the discovery of empirical laws, then
detail the logical structure of these laws. Lastly, we shall identify some
methodological guidelines which are compatible with an inductive search
for partial determinisms.
1 An example of operationalization: smok-
ing cessation and anxiety
[Fernandez & Catteeuw 2001, 125] put forward the following se-
quence:
General hypothesis: undergoing smoking cessation tends to
increase anxiety in smokers rather than reduce it.
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↓
Operational hypothesis: smokers undergoing smoking cessa-
tion are more prone to anxiety than non-cessation smokers.
↓
Null hypothesis: there is no difference between anxiety scores
for smokers undergoing smoking cessation and non-cessation
smokers.
This example can be expanded so as to offer more opportunities to engage
with the critical exercise. There is no difficulty in taking [Fernandez &
Catteeuw 2001] operational hypothesis as a ‘general hypothesis’. Their
formulation specifies neither the empirical (nominal) meaning of the no-
tion of smoking cessation, nor the empirical (ordinal or quantitative)
significance of the notion of anxiety, even though it makes reference to
the ordinal operatormore prone to anxiety than; lastly, the noun smokers
signifies only an indefinite number of people who smoke.
The researcher may have given themselves a set of criteria which is
sufficient to decide whether, at the moment when they examine an indi-
vidual, the person is a smoker or not, and if they are a smoker, another
set of criteria sufficient to decide whether or not they are undergoing
smoking cessation. These sets of criteria allow the values for two nominal
variables to be defined, the first attributing the value of smoker or non-
smoker, and the second, which is conditional on the status of ‘smoker’,
attributing the value of undergoing cessation or non-cessation. However,
the statistical definition of the ‘undergoing cessation’ variable requires
a domain, i.e. elements assigned a value according to its codomain,
the (descriptive) reference system of the variable: {undergoing cessa-
tion, non-cessation}. The researcher may circumscribe the domain to
pairs (smoker, examination date) which they already have obtain or will
obtain during the course of their study, and thus define a so-called inde-
pendent nominal variable.
They then need to specify the function which assigns an anxiety score
for each (smoker, examination date) pair, in order to define the ‘anxiety
score’ statistical variable, taken as the dependent variable. The usual
solution for specifying such a function consists in using the answers to an
anxiety questionnaire to determine this score, according to a numerical
coding rule for the responses to the items on the questionnaire. Such
procedures, in which standardised observation of a verbal behaviour is
associated with the numerical coding of responses, constitute one of the
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fundamental contributions of psychotechnics (or psychological testing)
to Psychology; it enables anxiety means conditional on the values of
the independent variable to be calculated, whence the operational hy-
pothesis: smokers undergoing smoking cessation are more anxious than
non-cessation smokers.
The operational hypothesis constitutes a descriptive proposition
whose validity can easily be examined. However, to the extent that
they consider their sample of observations to be a means of testing
a general hypothesis, the researcher must also demonstrate that the
mean difference observed is significant, i.e. rejects the null hypoth-
esis of the equality of the means for the statistical populations com-
posed of the two types of smokers, using a probabilistic procedure se-
lected from the available range of inferential techniques, for instance
Student’s t-test for independent samples. Only then can the opera-
tional hypothesis, considered in the light of the two statistical popu-
lations, acquire the status of an alternative hypothesis with respect to
the null hypothesis.
Now, let us restate the sequence of hypotheses put forward by
[Fernandez & Catteeuw 2001] thus:
General hypothesis: smokers undergoing smoking cessation
are more anxious than non-cessation smokers
↓
Operational hypothesis: given a pair of variables (‘undergo-
ing cessation’, ‘anxiety score’), mean anxiety conditional on
the undergoing cessation value is greater than mean anxiety
conditional on the non-cessation value.
↓
Null hypothesis: the two conditional means are equal.
2 Operationalization criticised
The example which we have just developed is typical of operational-
ization in Psychology, irrespective of the experimental or correlational
nature [Cronbach 1957, 1975] of the study. In this section, we make
two assertions by dealing with the operationalization approach in re-
verse: (i) the empirical relevance of the test of the null hypothesis is
indeterminate (ii) the statistical fact of a mean difference has no general
empirical import.
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2.1 The myth of the statistical population
To simplify the discussion, let us suppose that the researcher tests
the null hypothesis of the equality of two means using Student’s t proce-
dure. The issue at stake in the test from a socio-technical point of view is
that by qualifying the difference observed as a significant difference, the
cherished notation “p < .05” or “p < .01” may be included in a research
paper. The null hypothesis test has been the subject of purely statisti-
cal criticisms e.g., [Krueger 2001], [Nickerson 2000] and it is not within
the scope of this paper to draw up an inventory of these criticisms. In
the empirical perspective under examination here, the problem is that
this type of procedure is nothing more than a rhetorical device, inso-
far as the populations to which the test procedure is applied remain
virtual in nature.
In practice, the researcher knows how to define their conditional vari-
ables on the basis of pairs: (smoker undergoing cessation, examination
date) and (non-cessation smoker, examination date), assembled by them
through observation. But what is the significance of the statistical pop-
ulation to which the inferential exercise makes reference? If we consider
the undergoing cessation value, for example, how should the statisti-
cal population of the (smoker undergoing cessation, examination date)
pairs be defined? Let us imagine a survey which would enable the anx-
iety score for all the human beings on the planet with the status of
‘smoker undergoing smoking cessation’ to be known on a certain date
each month in the interval of time under consideration. We would then
have as many populations as we have monthly surveys; we could then
consider grouping together all of these monthly populations to define the
population of observations relating to the ‘cessation’ status. There is not
one single population, but rather a number of virtual populations. The
null hypothesis is therefore based on a mental construct. As soon as
this is defined more precisely, questions arise as to its plausibility and
the interest of the test. Indeed, why should a survey supply an anxiety
variable whose conditional means, subject to change, are identical?
Ultimately, it appears that the null hypothesis test constitutes a
decision-making procedure with respect to the plausibility of a hypothe-
sis devoid of any determined empirical meaning. The statistical inference
used in the operationalization system is an odd way of settling the issue
of generality: it involves deciding whether the difference between ob-
served means may be generalised, even if the empirical meaning of this
generality has not been established.
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2.2 The myth of the average smoker
The difference between the two anxiety means may be interpreted as
the difference between the degree of anxiety of the average smoker un-
dergoing cessation and the degree of anxiety of the average non-cessation
smoker, which poses two problems. Firstly, the discrete nature of the
anxiety score contains a logical dead-end, i.e. the use of an impossibility
to describe something which is possible. Let us assume an anxiety ques-
tionnaire comprising five items with answers scored 0, 1, 2 or 3, such
that the score attributed to any group of 5 responses will fall within
the sequence of natural numbers (0, 1, . . . , 15). A mean score of 8.2
may indeed ‘summarise’ a set of scores, but cannot exist as an individual
score. Consequently, should we wish to use a mean score to describe a
typical smoker, it must be recognised that such a smoker is not possi-
ble and therefore not plausible. As a result, the difference between the
two means cannot be used to describe the difference in degrees of anx-
iety of the typical smokers, unless it is admitted that a typical smoker
is in fact a myth.
Let us now assume that the numerical coding technique enables a
continuous variable to be defined by the use of so-called analogue re-
sponse scales. The score of any smoker is by definition composed of the
sum of two quantities, the mean score plus the deviation from the mean,
the latter expressing the fact that the typical smoker is replaced in prac-
tice by a particular specimen of the statistical population, whose variable
nature is assumed to be random—without it appearing necessary to have
empirical grounds for the probability space on which this notion is based.
In these conditions, the mean score constitutes a parameter, whose spec-
ification is an empirical matter inasmuch as the statistical population
is actually defined. An empirical parameter is not, however, the same
thing as an empirical law.
3 Formalization of an empirical law
According to the nomothetic perspective, scientific ambition consists
in discovering laws, i.e. general implications. 2 A general implication is
2. This is a more general and radical restatement of the definition given by [Piaget
1970, 17] of the notion of laws. For him laws designate “relatively constant quantita-
tive relations which may be expressed in the form of mathematical functions”, “general
fact” or “ordinal relationships, [...] structural analyses, etc. which are expressed in
ordinary language or in more or less formalized language (logic, etc.)”.
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a statement in the following form:
∀ x ∈ A, p(x) ⇒ q(x), (1)
which reads thus “for any x of A, if p(x) then q(x)”, where x is any
component of a given set A, and p(⋅) and q(⋅) are singular statements.
This formalization applies without any difficulty to any situation in
which the researcher has a pair of variables (X, Y ), from a domain
Ωn = {ωi, i = 1, . . . , n}, whose elements ωi are pairs (person, observa-
tion date). The codomain of the independent variable X is a descrip-
tive reference system of initial conditions M(X) = {xi, i = 1, . . . , k},
whilst the dependent variable, Y , specifies a value reference system,
M(Y ) = {yi, i = 1, . . . , l}, the effective observation of which de-
pends, by hypothesis, on the independent conditions. Thus, the onto-
logical substrate of an empirical law is the observation reference system
Ω×M(X)×M(Y ), where Ω ⊃ Ωn is an extrapolation of Ωn: any element
of Ω is, as a matter of principle, assigned a unique value inM(X)×M(Y )
by means of the function (X, Y ).
Two comments arise from this definition. Firstly, as noted by [Popper
1959, 48], “[natural laws] do not assert that something exists or is the
case; they deny it” . In other words, they state a general ontological
impossibility in terms of Ω ×M(X) ×M(Y ): a law may indeed by for-
mulated by identifying the initial conditions α(X) ⊂M(X) for which a
non-empty subset β(Y ) ⊂M(Y ) exists such that,
∀ ω ∈ Ω, X(ω) ∈ α(X) ⇒ Y (ω) ∈ β(Y ). (2)
This formulation excludes the possibility of X(ω) ∈ α(X) and Y (ω) ∈
∁β(Y ) being observed, where ∁β(Y ) designates the complementary set
β(Y ) with respect to M(Y ). Making a statement in the form of (2)
amounts to stating a general empirical fact in terms of Ωn, and an em-
pirical law in terms of Ω, by inductive generalisation. This law can be
falsified, simply by exhibiting an example of what is said to be impossi-
ble in order to falsify it. The general nature of the statement stems from
the quantifier ∀ and its empirical limit is found in the extension of Ω.
The law may then be corroborated or falsified. If it is corroborated, it
is possible to measure its degree of corroboration by the number of ob-
servations applying to it, i.e. by the cardinality of the equivalence class
formed by the antecedents of α(X)—the class is noted ClΩn/X[α(X)].
The second comment relates to the notion of partial determinism.
The mathematical culture passed on through secondary school teaching
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familiarises honest researchers with the notion of numerical functions
y = f(x), which express a deterministic law, i.e. that x being given, y
necessarily has a point value. If the informative nature of the law is envis-
aged in negative terms [Dubois & Prade 2003], the necessity of the point
is defined as the impossibility of its complement. In the field of human-
ities [Granger 1995], seeking total determinisms appears futile, but this
does not imply that there is no general impossibility in Ω×M(X)×M(Y )
and therefore no partial determinism. The fact that partial determinism
may not have a utility value from the point of view of social or medi-
cal decision-making engineering has nothing to do with its fundamental
scientific value. The subject of nomothetic research therefore appears in
the form of a ‘gap’ in a descriptive reference system, this gap being the-
oretically interpreted as the effect of a general ontological impossibility.
This is why in teaching, a methodology to support the nomothetic goal
of training student researchers to ‘search for the impossible’ is called for.
4 How to seek the impossible
Discovery of a gap in the descriptive reference system involves the
discovery of a general empirical fact, from which an empirical law is
inferred by extending the set of observations Ωn to an unknown phe-
nomenological field Ω ⊃ Ωn (e.g. future events). A general empirical
fact makes sense only with reference to the descriptive reference sys-
tem M(X) ×M(Y ). Practically speaking, dependent and independent
variables are multivariate. Let X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xp) be a series of p
independent variables and M(X) the reference system of X ; M(X) is
the Cartesian product of the p reference systems M(Xi), i = 1, ⋯, p.
Similarly, let Y = (Y1, . . . , Yq) be a series of q dependent variables and
M(Y) the reference system of Y. The descriptive reference system of
the study is therefore:
M[(X, Y)] =M(X) ×M(Y) =M(X1) ×M(X2) ×⋯×M(Xp)
×M(Y1) ×⋯×M(Yq).
(3)
Thus the contingency table (the rows of which represent the multivari-
ate values of X, and the columns the multivariate values of Y) can be
defined. Observation readings are then carried out so that the cells in
the contingency table are gradually filled in... or remain empty.
Two cases must be distinguished here. The first corresponds to the
situation in which the researcher is completely ignorant of what is hap-
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pening in their observation reference system, in other words, they do
not have any prior observations. They therefore have to carry out some
kind of survey in order to learn more. Knowing what is happening in the
reference system means knowing the frequency of each possible state. It
does not involve calling on the notion of probability (the latter being
firmly in the realm of mathematical mythology) since it would involve
knowing the limit of the frequency of each cell in the contingency table
as the number of observations (n) tends towards infinity.
A nomothetic gap arises when there is at least one empty cell in at
least one row of the contingency table, when the margin of the row (or
rows) is well above the cardinality of M(Y). It is possible to identify all
the gaps in the reference system only if its cardinality is well below the
cardinality of Ωn, n. This empirical consideration sheds light on a spe-
cific epistemological drawback in Psychology: not only are its descriptive
reference systems not given naturally, as emphasised by [Danziger 1990,
2], 3 but in addition the depth of constructible reality is such that its
cardinality may be gigantic—so much so that discussing what is hap-
pening in an observation reference system cannot be achieved in terms
of sensible intuition. The fact is that the socio-technical norms which
shape the presentation of the observation techniques used in empirical
studies do not refer either to the notion of descriptive reference system
or the necessity of plotting the cardinality card[M(X)×M(Y)] against
the cardinality of the set of observations, card(Ωn) = n. If the quotient
card[M(X)×M(Y)]/n is not much lower than 1, planning to carry out
an exhaustive examination of the nomothetic gaps in the descriptive ref-
erence system is unfeasible. This does not prevent the researcher from
working on certain initial conditions α(X), but in such cases it must
nonetheless be established that dividing the number of values of M(Y)
by the cardinality of the class ClΩn/X[α(X)] of antecedents of α(X) in
Ωn gives a result which is far less than 1.
Let us now present the second case, for which it is assumed that
the researcher has been lucky enough to observe the phenomenon of a
gap, whose ‘coordinates’ in the descriptive reference system of the study
are [α(X), ∁β(Y)]. The permanent nature of this gap constitutes a
proper general hypothesis. This hypothesis should be tested using a
3. “But in terms of truth, scientific psychology does not deal with natural objects.
It deals with test scores, evaluation scales, response distributions, series lists, and
countless other items which the researcher does not discover but rather constructs
with great care. Conjectures about the world, whatever they may be, cannot escape
from this universe of artefacts.”
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targeted observation strategy. Indeed, accumulating observations in Ω is
of interest from the point of view of the hypothesis if these observations
are such that:
– X(ω) ∈ α(X), in which case we seek to verify that Y(ω) ∈ β(Y),
– Y(ω) ∈ ∁β(Y ), in which case we seek to verify that X(ω) ∈ ∁α(X).
This approach to observation is targeted, and indeed makes sense, in that
it focuses on a limited number of states: the researcher knows exactly
what they are looking for. It is the very opposite of blindly reproducing
an experimental plan or survey plan.
When a counterexample is discovered, i.e. ωe exists such that
X(ωe) ∈ α(X) and Y(ωe) ∈ ∁β(Y), this observation falsifies the general
hypothesis. The researcher can then decide either to reject the hypoth-
esis or to defend it. If they decide to defend it, they may restrict the
set of conditions α(X), or try to find a variable Xp+1 which modulates
verification of the rule. Formally speaking, this modulating variable is
such that there is a strict non-empty subset of M(Xp+1)—let this be
γ(Xp+1)—such that:
∀ ω ∈ Ω, [X(ω) ∈ α(X) and Xp+1(ω) ∈ γ(Xp+1)] ⇒ Y(ω) ∈ β(Y). (4)
Irrespective of how they revise the original hypothesis, they will have to
restrict its domain of validity with respect to the—implicit—set of pos-
sible descriptive reference systems. A major consequence of revising the
law by expanding the descriptive reference system of initial conditions
is resetting the corroboration counter, since the world being explored
has been given an additional descriptive dimension: this is the reference
system Ω ×M(X1) ×M(Y), where X1 = (X, Xp+1).
4.1 Example
Without it being necessary to develop the procedure presented here
in its entirety, we can illustrate it using the example of smokers’ anxiety.
The problem consists of restating the ‘general hypothesis’ as a statement
which is (i) general, properly speaking, as understood in (1) –, and (ii)
falsifiable. We may proceed in two stages. Firstly, it is not necessary
to talk in terms of reference systems to produce a general statement.
Expressing the problem in terms of the difference between two means
is not relevant to what is being sought; however, the idea according
to which any smoker undergoing cessation becomes more anxious may
be examined, along the lines of the ‘general hypothesis’ described by
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[Fernandez & Catteeuw 2001]. This idea is pre-referential inasmuch as
we are unable to define a smoker, a smoker undergoing cessation, or a
person who is becoming more anxious.
Since we cannot claim to be able to actually settle these issues of def-
inition, we shall use certain definitions for the purposes of convenience.
Let U be a population of people and T a population of dates on which
they were observed. Let Ωn be a subset of U × T × T such that, for any
triplet ω = (u, t1, t2), u is known on dates t1 and t2 in terms of their
status as:
– a non-smoker, a smoker undergoing cessation or a non-cessation
smoker
– and their state of anxiety, for instance with reference to a set of
clinical signs, of which the person is asked to evaluate the intensity
on date t, using a standard ‘state-anxiety’ questionnaire.
It can be noted that the set Ωn is a finite, non-virtual set, in that a
person u whose smoker status is not known on date t1 or t2 for example,
constitutes a triplet which does not belong to this set. According to
our approach to the statistical population, it is not necessary for the
observations to be the result of applying a specific random sampling
technique. Since Ωn constitutes a set of known observations from the
point of view of the descriptive reference system, it is a numbered set,
to which new observations can be added over time; whence the notation
Ωn (read “j-mat”), where n stands for the cardinality of the most recent
update to the set of observations.
We can then define the following variables X and Y, from the subset
P of Ωn , which includes the triplets (u, t1, t2) such that t2 − t1 = d,
where d is a transition time (e.g. 2 days). The variable X matches any
component of P with an image in M(X) = {nf, f1, f2}×{nf, f1, f2},
where nf , f1 and f2 signify ‘non-smoker’, ‘non-cessation smoker’ and
‘smoker undergoing cessation’ respectively. Let us call α(X) the subset
ofM(X) including all the pairs of values ending in f2 which do not begin
with f2 and take an element p ∈ P: the proposition ‘X(p) ∈ α(X)’
means that in the period during which they were observed, person u had
been undergoing smoking cessation for two days whereas they have not
been before. 4
The dependent variable Y must now be defined. Let us assume
that for any sign of anxiety, we have a description on an ordinal scale
4. It may be noted that an observation p such that X(p) = (nf, f2) is not
plausible; this relates to the question of the definition of the state of cessation and
does not affect the structure of the logic.
Operationalization and empirical laws in Psychology 117
(i.e., a Likert scale). Anxiety can then be described as a multivariate
state varying within a descriptive reference system A. Consider A ×A;
in this set a subset β(Y) can be defined which includes changes in
states defined as a worsening of the state of anxiety. The variable Y
can then be defined, which, for each p ∈ P, corresponds to a state in
M(Y). The proposition ‘Y(p) ∈ β(Y)’ signifies that in the period
during which they were observed, person u became more anxious. Lastly,
the general hypothesis can be formulated in terms which ensure that
it may be falsified:
∀ p ∈ P, X(p) ∈ α(X) ⇒ Y(p) ∈ β(Y). (5)
We have just illustrated an apparently hypothetical-deductive ap-
proach; but in fact it is an exploratory procedure if the community is
not aware of any database enabling a nomothetic gap to be identified.
Let us assume that the work of the researcher leads to the provision
of a database Ω236 for the community and that sets α(X) and β(Y)
are defined after the fact, such that at least one general fact may be
stated. The community with an interest in the general fact revealed by
this data may seek new supporting or falsifying observations in order to
help update the database.
If a researcher finds an individual v, with q = (v, tv1, tv2) and tv2 −
tv1 = d, such that X(q) ∈ α(X) and Y(q) ∈ ∁β(Y), this means
that there is a smoker who has been undergoing cessation for two days,
whose anxiety has not worsened. Let us assume that the researcher
investigates whether the person was already ‘very anxious’; they may
suggest that rule (5) should be revised so as to exclude people whose
initial clinical state corresponds to certain values in the reference system
A. This procedure usually consists in restricting the scope of validity of
the general hypotheses.
5 Discussion
Operationalization in Psychology consists in restating a pre-
referential proposition in order to enable the researcher to test a sta-
tistical null hypothesis, the rejection of which enables the ‘general hy-
pothesis’ to be credited with a certain degree of acceptability. 5 Using
5. [Meehl 1967] noted several decades ago that the greater the ‘experimental pre-
cision’, i.e. sample size, the easier it is to corroborate the alternative hypothesis.
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an example taken from [Fernandez & Catteeuw 2001], we have shown
that the aim of such a procedure is not the discovery of empirical laws,
i.e. the discovery of nomothetic gaps in a reference system. We shall
discuss two consequences of our radical approach to seeking empiri-
cal laws in an observation reference system Ω ×M(X) ×M(Y). The
first relates to the methodology for updating the state of knowledge
in a field of research, the second to the probabilistic interpretation
of accumulated observations.
The state of knowledge in a given field of research can be apprehended
in practical terms by means of a list ofm so-called scientific publications.
Let us call this set composed of specialist literature Lm and let li be an
element in this list. The knowledge historian can then ask the following
question: does text li allow an observation reference system of the type
Ωn×M(X)×M(Y) to be defined? Such a question can only be answered
in the affirmative if it is possible to specify the following:
1. n > 0 pairs (u, t),
2. p > 0 reference systems enabling the description of the initial con-
ditions affecting the n pairs (u, t),
3. q > 0 reference systems enabling the description of states affecting
the n pairs (u, t) according to the initial conditions in which they
are found.
Specifying a descriptive reference system consists in identifying a fi-
nite set of mutually exclusive values. Not all the description methods
used in Psychology allow such a set to be defined; for example, a close
examination of the so-called Exner scoring system [Exner 1995] for ver-
batims which may be collected for any [Rorschach 1921] test card did
not enable us to determine the Cartesian product of the possible val-
ues. And yet, to find a gap in a reference system, this reference system
must be constituted, so as to form a stabilised and objective descriptive
framework. Faced with such a situation, a knowledge historian would be
justified in describing a scientific era in which research is based on such
a form of descriptive methodology as being a pre-referential age.
With regard to the matter of the objectivity of a descriptive reference
system, we shall confine ourselves to introducing the notion of score-
objectivity. Let P = {pi, i = 1, . . . , z} be a set of Psychologists and
ωj ∈ Ω. (X, Y)i(ωj) is the value of ωj in M(X) ×M(Y) as determined
by the Psychologist pi. We may say thatM(X)×M(Y) is score-objective
relative to P if (X, Y)i(ωj) depends only on j for all values of j. If
a descriptive reference system is not score-objective, an event in Ω ×
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M(X)×M(Y) which occurs in a gap cannot categorically be interpreted
as a falsifying observation, since it may depend on a particular feature
of the way the reporting Psychologist views it. Unless and until the
descriptive definition of an event is regulated in a score-objective manner,
the nomothetic aspiration appears to be premature, since it requires
the objective world to be singular in nature. 6 Only once a descriptive
reference system has been identified may the knowledge historian test
its score-objectivity experimentally.
The historian might well discover that a field of research is in fact as-
sociated with the use of divergent description reference systems. Their
task would then be to connect these different fields of reality by at-
tempting to define the problem of the correspondence between the im-
possibilities identified in the field Ra and the impossibilities identified
in the field Rb—which assumes such identification is possible. Given
a certain descriptive reference system of cardinality c, the historian
may evaluate its explorability and perhaps note that certain descrip-
tion reference systems are inexplorable. Concerning explorable reference
systems, they could perhaps try to retrieve data collected during the
course of empirical studies, constitute an updated database, and seek
nomothetic gaps in it. 7
Let us now move on to the second point of this discussion. If the
reference system is explorable and assumed to be score-objective, it may
be that each of its possible states has been observed at least once. In
this case, the descriptive reference system is sterile from the nomothetic
point of view and this constitutes a singular observation fact: everything
is possible therein. In other words, given an object in a certain initial
state, nothing can be asserted regarding its Y-state. This does not pre-
vent the decision-making engineer from wagering on the object’s Y-state
based on the distribution of Y-states, conditioned by the initial condi-
tions in which the object is found. These frequencies may be used to
measure ‘expectancies’, but they do not form a basis on which to deduce
the existence of a probability function for these states. Indeed, defin-
ing a random variable Y or Y∣X requires the definition of a probability
6. We cannot simply classify the sources of score-subjectivity as measurement er-
rors in the quantitative domain [Stigler 1986], since most descriptive reference systems
in Psychology are qualitative; diverging viewpoints for the same event described in
a certain descriptive reference system represent an error, not of measurement, but of
definition.
7. This type of database, established by merging several databases, has nothing to
do with the aggregation methodology of ‘meta-analyses’ based on the use of statistical
summaries e.g., [Rosenthal & DiMatteo 2001].
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space on the basis of the possible states M(X) ×M(Y). In order to be
probabilistic, such a space requires a probability space established on the
basis of Ω e.g. [Renyi 1966]. Since Ω is a virtual set, adding objective
probabilities to it is wishful thinking: seeing (X, Y) as a pair of random
variables constitutes an unfalsifiable interpretation. Since such an inter-
pretation is nonetheless of interest for making decisions, the existence of
a related law of probability being postulated, the probability of a given
state may be estimated on the basis of its frequency. The higher the
total number of observations, the more accurate this estimation will be,
which is why a database established by bringing together the existing
databases is of interest. With the advent of the internet, recourse to
probabilistic mythology no longer requires the inferential machinery of
null-hypotheses testers to be deployed; it rather requires the empirical
stabilization of the parameters of the mythical law.
We conclude this critical analysis with a reminder that scientific re-
search in Psychology is also aimed at the discovery of empirical laws.
This requires two types of objectives to be distinguished with care: prac-
tical objectives, which focus on decision amid uncertainty, and nomoth-
etic objectives, which focus on the detection of empirical impossibilities.
Has so-called scientific Psychology been able to discover any empirical
laws, and if so, what are they? From our contemporary standpoint, this
question is easy to answer in principle—if not in practice.
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